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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal stems from a failed agreement to distribute 
robotic medical devices, but the issue before us is a threshold 
question of jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act (the 
“FAA”).  The case comes to us in the unusual posture of an 
interlocutory appeal from an order denying summary 
judgment, a type of order not normally before this Court, but 
one the Appellant urges us to sweep within the ambit of 
appellate jurisdiction under § 16 of the FAA on the ground 
that it is the equivalent of an order denying a petition to 
compel arbitration.  We hold that § 16 does not sweep so 
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broadly and therefore will dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
I. Background 
 A. Factual History1 
 Appellee Devon Robotics, LLC (“Devon”) acquired 
the rights to distribute two robotic medical devices, CytoCare 
and i.v. Station, from an Italian corporation, Health Robotics, 
S.r.l. (“Health Robotics”).  Appellant Gaspar DeViedma 
(“DeViedma”), the general counsel for Health Robotics, 
negotiated the distribution contracts for both CytoCare and 
i.v. Station.  Each contract contained an identical arbitration 
clause: 
Disputes between the parties arising out of, in 
relation to, or in connection with this agreement 
or the breach thereof shall be finally settled by 
binding arbitration.  Any arbitration shall be 
conducted in English under the rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce by a 
single, mutually-agreed-to arbitrator and shall 
be held in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
(App. 153 n.1.)     
                                              
1 This factual summary is derived from the District 
Court’s Memorandum and Order on the parties’ cross 
motions for summary judgment. 
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The CytoCare contract, which is the focus of this 
dispute, was executed in September 2008.  By February 2009, 
CytoCare sales were not performing as the parties had hoped.  
To help Devon boost sales, the parties executed a Second 
Amendment to the CytoCare Distribution Agreement in 
which Health Robotics agreed to provide executive 
management consulting services to be performed by 
DeViedma.  Pursuant to that amendment, DeViedma began 
acting as Devon’s Chief Operating Officer (“COO”).   
 Over the next few months, Devon conducted 
negotiations with McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”) 
regarding a sublicensing agreement for CytoCare, but 
DeViedma allegedly obstructed McKesson’s ability to 
complete a due diligence trip to Health Robotics’s 
manufacturing facilities in Italy.  Meanwhile, Devon failed to 
make franchise fee payments to Health Robotics, leading 
Health Robotics to draw down a $5 million line of credit that 
Itochu International, Inc. (“Itochu”) had extended to Health 
Robotics and Devon had guaranteed.  In turn, this led Itochu 
to bring a suit against Devon to recoup the $5 million as well 
as an unrelated debt.   
 Shortly thereafter, in June 2009, DeViedma stopped 
serving as Devon’s COO, and Devon and Health Robotics 
executed a Fourth Amendment to the CytoCare Distribution 
Agreement reflecting that the management consulting 
services had been terminated.  Health Robotics then 
terminated its CytoCare contract with Devon altogether and 
entered into a direct agreement with McKesson, with 
DeViedma signing the termination letter to Devon in his 
capacity as Health Robotics’s general counsel.  Health 
Robotics also sent Devon a notice alleging breaches of their 
i.v. Station agreement, and DeViedma e-mailed several of 
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Devon’s hospital customers telling them that Devon faced 
financial difficulties and bankruptcy proceedings, and that 
Devon lacked staff qualified to manage i.v. Station robot 
installations.   
B. Procedural History 
Devon filed suit against DeViedma and McKesson in 
August 2009, claiming breach of fiduciary duty, tortious 
interference with current and prospective contractual 
relations, defamation, and conspiracy.  In response, 
DeViedma filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: first, 
that the complaint must be dismissed in favor of arbitration, 
and second, that Devon failed to state any claim upon which 
relief could be granted.  The District Court granted the motion 
only in part.2  DeViedma did not appeal that order, and 
extensive litigation followed.  Over the next seventeen 
months, the parties expended considerable time and resources 
in discovery, producing hundreds of thousands of pages of 
documents and taking approximately twenty-six depositions. 
DeViedma then filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the remaining two claims against him, which were for 
                                              
2 The District Court dismissed the claims for 
conspiracy and tortious interference with prospective 
contractual relations but found the others did not arise out of 
the agreements containing the arbitration clauses.  In addition, 
the District Court dismissed claims brought by Appellees 
Devon Health Services, Inc. and Dr. John A. Bennett, and the 
parties subsequently stipulated to dismissal of the defamation 
claims. 
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breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with current 
contractual relations.  He repeated his argument that the 
claims against him could only be brought in arbitration in 
Switzerland.  In the Memorandum and Order that are the 
subject of this appeal, the District Court rejected his 
arguments in favor of arbitration, but granted summary 
judgment on Devon’s tortious interference claim, leaving 
only Devon’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.  DeViedma then 
filed this interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the 
District Court’s order holding that Devon’s claims were not 
subject to arbitration, and Devon moved to dismiss the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.       
II. Discussion 
 Devon argues that there are three independent reasons 
we lack jurisdiction over this appeal: that the District Court’s 
Order denying summary judgment is not appealable under § 
16 of the FAA because it is not an order “denying an 
application under section 206 of [Title 9] to compel 
arbitration,” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C); that DeViedma’s Notice 
of Appeal is defective because DeViedma inadvertently cited 
to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) instead of 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C);3 
and that DeViedma waived his right to compel arbitration 
because he opted not to seek an interlocutory appeal of the 
                                              
3 Subsection (B) of § 16 permits an appeal from an 
order “denying a petition under [9 U.S.C. § 4] to order 
arbitration to proceed,” whereas Subsection (C) permits an 
appeal from an order “denying an application under [9 U.S.C. 
§ 206] to compel arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), (C).   
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District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and instead 
engaged in protracted litigation.4    
                                              
 4 Devon raises this argument as a bar to jurisdiction, 
although we have generally treated waiver of the right to 
compel arbitration as a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one.  
See, e.g., In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 
700 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2012); Gray Holdco, Inc. v. 
Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
In addition, Devon argues, on the merits, that 
DeViedma cannot compel arbitration because he was not a 
party to the contracts containing arbitration clauses—a 
contention we note may also bear on jurisdiction, as a party 
must allege a “prima facie case of entitlement” to arbitration 
in order to obtain interlocutory review under § 16(a) of the 
FAA.  Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 212-
13 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(analyzing a party’s status as a non-signatory as both a 
jurisdictional and merits issue).  DeViedma counters, first, 
that he is entitled to arbitration because he was acting at 
relevant times as an agent of signatory Health Robotics.  See 
Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 
F.3d 1110, 1122 (3d Cir. 1993) (“In keeping with the federal 
policy favoring arbitration, we . . . will extend the scope of 
the arbitration clauses to agents of the party who signed the 
agreements.”).  Second, he asserts that Devon should be 
equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration because its 
claims are closely intertwined with the CytoCare contract.  
See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber 
& Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 201-02 (3d Cir. 
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 In such a situation, “there is no mandatory ‘sequencing 
of jurisdictional issues,’” and we enjoy “leeway ‘to choose 
among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on 
the merits’” in the order that best serves judicial economy.  
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 
422, 431, 435-36 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1999)).  We need not reach 
Devon’s alternative arguments because we conclude we lack 
jurisdiction under § 16(a)(1)(C), and, therefore, this appeal 
must be dismissed.  
 A. Orders Appealable Under § 16(a)(1)(C) 
 In the ordinary course, we possess jurisdiction over 
only “final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The FAA, however, provides for 
appellate jurisdiction of certain categories of interlocutory 
orders, including orders “denying an application under 
section 206 . . . to compel arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(C).  Devon contends that we lack jurisdiction 
under that provision because DeViedma is appealing from not 
an order denying an application under § 206 to compel 
arbitration but, rather, a motion for summary judgment in 
favor of arbitration, and “[t]he denial of a summary judgment 
motion is not a final order,” United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 
                                                                                                     
2001) (collecting cases compelling signatories on basis of 
equitable estoppel to arbitrate against non-signatories claims 
that were intertwined with contracts containing arbitration 
clauses).  We have no occasion to address these arguments 
because we will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on other 
grounds. 
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284, 286 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Boeing Co. v. Int’l Union, 
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 
370 F.2d 969, 970 (3d Cir. 1967)).     
 In Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we identified a similar issue: whether to interpret 
§ 16 of the FAA as reaching the denial of a motion to dismiss 
in favor of arbitration.  See 111 F.3d at 348.  We 
acknowledged there is some logic to treating a motion to 
dismiss in favor of arbitration like a motion to compel 
arbitration under § 16, but also posited that “linguistically, a 
motion to dismiss, even for failure to pursue the statutorily 
provided threshold arbitral remedy, is a far cry from a 
‘motion to compel arbitration.’”  Id. at 349.  Because we 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on different 
grounds, however, we did not reach the issue.  We do reach it 
today and conclude that § 16(a)(1)(C) does not extend to 
denials of motions for summary judgment.    
  1. Statutory Text 
  Our analysis begins with the statutory text.  Section 16 
of the FAA provides that: 
(a)  An appeal may be taken from— 
(1)  an order— 
(A)  refusing a stay of any action under 
  section 3 of this title, 
(B)  denying a petition under section 4 
of this title to order arbitration to 
proceed, 
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(C)  denying an application under 
section 206 of this title to compel 
arbitration, 
(D)  confirming or denying 
confirmation of an award or 
partial award, or 
(E)  modifying, correcting, or vacating 
  an award; 
(2)  an interlocutory order granting, 
continuing, or modifying an injunction 
against an arbitration that is subject to 
this title; or 
(3)  a final decision with respect to an 
arbitration that is subject to this title. 
 
9 U.S.C. § 16(a).  As the Supreme Court instructed in Green 
Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 
(2000), “we apply the ‘plain language of the statutory text’ in 
interpreting the FAA.”  Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 
263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 88).  
“We do not look past the plain meaning unless it produces a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters 
or an outcome so bizarre that Congress could not have 
intended it.”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
“statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed.”  
Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 515 
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(2007) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  That command carries extra force for statutes 
authorizing interlocutory appeals, which are exceptions to the 
final decision rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and “the long-
established policy against piecemeal appeals.”  Gardner v. 
Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).  Thus, 
“we must construe the scope of the provision with great care 
and circumspection” and “approach this statute somewhat 
gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the 
exception many pretrial orders.”  Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 
670 F.2d 440, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Switz. Cheese 
Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, the plain language of the FAA provides no 
support for exercising jurisdiction over an order denying a 
motion for summary judgment.  Even when motivated by a 
conclusion that claims are not subject to arbitration, an order 
denying summary judgment is not an order “denying an 
application under section 206 of this title to compel 
arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C); see Harrison, 111 F.3d 
at 349. And under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all 
others”), Congress’s enumeration of several categories of 
appealable orders, but not orders denying summary judgment, 
indicates that Congress intended orders denying summary 
judgment to fall outside the scope of § 16.  See, e.g., 
Delaware Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 747 F.3d 215, 221 
(3d Cir. 2014).     
  2. Statutory Structure 
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 The structure of the FAA further compels us to read § 
16 as excluding orders denying summary judgment.  Section 
16 is strikingly specific in describing the categories of orders 
from which we may hear interlocutory appeals.  It names 
orders “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order 
arbitration to proceed” and orders “denying an application 
under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration.”  9 
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), (C) (emphasis added).  These references 
to §§ 4 and 206 are telling.   
Section 4 outlines a procedure for a party to “petition” 
a court for “an order directing that such arbitration proceed,” 
not an order granting summary judgment.  9 U.S.C. § 4.  
Section 206 similarly provides that a court “may direct that 
arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any 
place therein provided for, whether that place is within or 
without the United States”; it does not provide that a court 
may grant summary judgment.  9 U.S.C. § 206.  Had 
Congress defined the categories of appealable orders using 
more malleable language—such as “orders denying motions 
to compel arbitration,” “orders denying requests to compel 
arbitration,” “orders refusing to enforce arbitration 
agreements,” or “orders hostile to arbitration”—the argument 
for jurisdiction over some orders denying summary judgment 
might be stronger.  But Congress’s decision to specify denials 
of § 4 petitions or § 206 applications indicates that § 16 is not 
so elastic.5 
                                              
 5 For simplicity’s sake, we refer in this opinion to § 4 
petitions and § 206 applications interchangeably as motions 
to compel arbitration.   
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 We conducted a similar analysis of the FAA in Lloyd, 
where we considered § 3 of the statute.  Section 3 provides 
that, upon the application of a party, a district court “shall” 
stay proceedings that are referable to arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 
3.6  In Lloyd, we held that a district court lacked discretion to 
dismiss, rather than stay, a case under § 3 where the parties 
had requested a stay and not a dismissal.  369 F.3d at 269.  
After reviewing the text of § 3, we opted to “side with those 
courts that take the Congressional text at face value” and 
reasoned that the statute’s “directive that the Court ‘shall’ 
enter a stay simply cannot be read to say that the Court shall 
enter a stay in all cases except those in which all claims are 
arbitrable and the Court finds dismissal to be the preferable 
approach.”  Id.   
 We also analyzed whether exercising jurisdiction was 
consistent with the structure of the FAA.  We noted the 
ongoing role of the district court after sending all of the 
claims in a lawsuit to arbitration, including resolving disputes 
                                              
 6 In full, this section states:  “If any suit or proceeding 
be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any 
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing 
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, 
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or 
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the 
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the 
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such 
arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. § 3. 
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regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, compelling 
witnesses, and entering judgment on an award.  Id. at 270 
(citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 5, 7, 9-11).  If a case were dismissed 
rather than stayed, the parties would have to file a new action 
each time the court’s assistance was required, and the dispute 
could be assigned to different judges over the course of the 
arbitration.  Id.  Furthermore, whereas an order granting a 
stay under § 3 is not immediately appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 
16(b),7 an order dismissing claims in favor of arbitration is 
immediately appealable because it is a final order.  Lloyd, 369 
F.3d at 270.  Consequently, construing § 3 as permitting 
district courts to dismiss claims instead of staying them would 
have altered the statutory scheme of appeals.  Ultimately, we 
held that a “literal reading of § 3” was the only reading 
                                              
 7 Section 16(b) provides that: 
 
 Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of 
title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory 
order— 
 
 (1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this 
 title; 
 (2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of 
 this title; 
 (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this 
 title; or 
 (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to 
 this title. 
 
9 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
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consistent with the structure of the FAA and the strong 
national policy in favor of arbitration.  Id. at 271.        
So, too, must we construe § 16 by its plain terms.  
Consider the procedures § 4 specifies for § 16 motions to 
compel arbitration:  A party’s ability to “petition any United 
States district court . . . for an order directing that . . . 
arbitration proceed” is conditioned on the opposing party’s 
“failure, neglect, or refusal . . . to arbitrate,” and the petitioner 
must give the opposing party “[f]ive days’ notice in writing” 
of the petition.  9 U.S.C. § 4.8  Moreover, the inquiry a district 
court is required to undertake in analyzing a motion to 
compel arbitration differs significantly from the analysis 
required for a motion for summary judgment.  As we 
explained in Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 
716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2013), where “the party opposing 
arbitration can demonstrate, by means of citations to the 
record, that there is a genuine dispute as to the enforceability 
of the arbitration clause, the court may then proceed 
summarily to a trial regarding the making of the arbitration 
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the 
same, as Section 4 of the FAA envisions.”  Id. at 776 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).   
Because of these prescribed procedures, equating a 
denial of summary judgment with a denial of a motion to 
compel under § 16 could be quite consequential.  For 
                                              
 8 Under § 208, the requirements of § 4 apply to § 206 
applications as well, provided there is no conflict between the 
two provisions.  See Control Screening LLC v. Technological 
Application & Prod. Co. (Tecapro), HCMC-Viet., 687 F.3d 
163, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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example, a party trying to enforce an arbitration agreement 
but seeking to avoid trial on the issue of arbitrability could 
file a motion for summary judgment instead of a § 4 petition 
(or § 206 application) and then seek immediate review if the 
motion is denied.  Even if any concerns about these kinds of 
procedural differences would be modest in practice, they 
indicate that construing § 16 to open the door to interlocutory 
appeals from orders denying motions for summary judgment 
is incompatible with the structure of the FAA.  Therefore, we 
conclude that § 16 “simply cannot be read” to grant us 
jurisdiction over orders denying motions for summary 
judgment.  See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269. 
  B. Our Approach to Applying § 16(a)(1)(C) 
 That conclusion, however, does not necessarily end 
our inquiry, for the question remains whether we should 
construe the order denying DeViedma’s motion for summary 
judgment as a denial of a motion to compel arbitration.  Most 
Courts of Appeals have addressed this question only in the 
context of motions to dismiss, and they have answered it in a 
variety of ways. 
 At one end of the spectrum, the D.C. Circuit has 
adopted a narrow approach to jurisdiction under § 16, 
declining to “treat” the defendant’s motion as something 
other than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and reasoning 
that the “principle of narrow construction . . . counsels against 
broad construction of a motion forwarded for review.”  
Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 333 F.3d 
250, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The Bombardier court went on to 
explain that “even if [it] were to construe a motion to dismiss 
more broadly in some circumstances,” it would not do so 
there, primarily because the motion to dismiss “exhibited no 
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intent to pursue arbitration—indeed, it sought outright 
dismissal with no guarantee of future arbitration.”  Id.; see 
also Wabtec Corp. v. Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB, 525 F.3d 
135, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Bombardier, 333 F.3d at 254) 
(declining to exercise jurisdiction where a motion to dismiss 
did not explicitly or implicitly request the district court to 
“direct that arbitration be held” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 At the other end are the First and Sixth Circuits, which 
have adopted a broad approach.  Thus, in Fit Tech, Inc. v. 
Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004), 
the court treated the defendant’s request for dismissal in favor 
of arbitration “as encompassing the lesser alternative remedy 
of a stay and reference” because “no one ha[d] been 
prejudicially misled by [its] request for an over-favorable 
remedy of dismissal.”  Id. at 6; see also Sourcing Unlimited, 
526 F.3d at 46 (“A movant’s choice to request dismissal 
rather than a stay of proceedings during referral to arbitration 
is within the ambit of § 16(a).”).  And the Sixth Circuit has 
held simply that § 16 grants appellate jurisdiction over 
“refusal[s] to enforce, through dismissal or stay, an agreement 
to arbitrate.”  Simon v. Pfizer, Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 772 (6th 
Cir. 2005); accord Turi v. Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP, 633 
F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Simon, 398 F.3d at 772-
73) (“The district court’s denial of Main Street’s motion to 
dismiss, which was based on the parties’ arbitration clause, is 
independently reviewable under the Federal Arbitration Act . 
. . .”). 
 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has taken a 
functional approach, focusing on the relief requested by a 
motion and holding that “in order to invoke the appellate 
jurisdiction provided in § 16(a), the defendant in the district 
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court must either move to compel arbitration and stay 
litigation explicitly under the FAA, or must make it plainly 
apparent that he seeks only the remedies provided for by the 
FAA—namely, arbitration rather than any judicial 
determination—in his prayer for relief.”  Conrad v. Phone 
Directories Co., 585 F.3d 1376, 1385 (10th Cir. 2009).  The 
court in Conrad thus dismissed the appeal because, despite 
“mention[ing] that the court might compel arbitration in one 
sentence of its memorandum,” the appellant’s motion asked 
only for dismissal, not for any relief under the FAA.  Id. at 
1386.  The Fourth Circuit is in accord.  See Rota-McLarty v. 
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 698-99 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (articulating an approach focusing on the relief 
requested in a motion); see also Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 
733 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying Conrad to an order 
granting cross motions for partial summary judgment). 
 We now join the Tenth and Fourth Circuits in focusing 
our § 16(a) inquiry on a movant’s requested relief.  While the 
analytical approach we adopt here will not turn solely on the 
caption of a motion, we have two concerns with looking 
much farther.  First, construing motions as “petitions under 
section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed” or 
“applications under section 206 of this title to compel 
arbitration,” when they are not, has the effect of expanding 
the scope of § 16 when our mandate is to construe it 
narrowly.  See supra at 9-11.  Second, jurisdiction over an 
appeal “must be determined by focusing upon the category of 
order appealed from,” Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 
U.S. 624, 628 (2009) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 
299, 311 (1996)), and in fashioning any rule of appellate 
jurisdiction, predictability is paramount, see Jerome B. 
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 
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527, 547-48 (1995); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 
404-06 (1957) (“Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts of a 
particular case. The Congress necessarily has had to draw the 
jurisdictional statutes in terms of categories.”).  Allowing our 
jurisdiction to turn on a case-by-case evaluation of how 
central an arbitration clause is to a party’s argument for 
dismissal or summary judgment is the antithesis of 
predictability.  Both of these concerns counsel against 
determining jurisdiction based on the contents, rather than the 
caption, of a motion. 
 Nonetheless, we recognize the need for a limited look 
beyond the caption itself, both to ensure that a true motion to 
compel is not overlooked and to ensure that parties cannot 
“‘game’ the captions of their motions in an effort to gain an 
interlocutory appeal where none is warranted.”  Conrad, 585 
F.3d at 1385.  We have charted this course before in 
construing orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), which provides 
for appellate jurisdiction over certain kinds of interlocutory 
appeals, including appeals from orders “granting, continuing, 
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to 
dissolve or modify injunctions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).9  In 
an opinion by then-Judge Alito, dismissing an appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1), we explained that “when 
determining our jurisdiction, we must examine the substance 
                                              
 9 The Tenth Circuit found its own analysis of § 
1292(a)(1) instructive in developing an analytical approach to 
§ 16 of the FAA.  See Conrad, 585 F.3d at 1385 (citing 
Pimentel & Sons Guitar Makers, Inc. v. Pimentel, 477 F.3d 
1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
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of the order rather than merely its language.”  U.S. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Asbestospray, Inc., 182 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 500 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 
1974) (en banc)).  We noted that “the labels attached by the 
district court to its order are not determinative,” id. (quoting 
Gregory v. Depte, 896 F.2d 31, 38 n.14 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted), and thus looked to the 
operative terms of the January 1998 order before us as well as 
the underlying motion, which was a “motion seeking 
clarification of the original restraining order,” id. at 206.  We 
then concluded that the order did not modify a June 1997 
injunction, but rather, clarified its scope, notwithstanding the 
district court’s use of the term “MODIFIED” in its January 
1998 order, and that, as such, it was not appealable under § 
1292(a)(1).  Id. at 207.  
 Likewise, we hold that to determine whether an order 
constitutes an order that is appealable under § 16, we examine 
the label and the operative terms of the district court’s order,10 
                                              
 10 We recognize that many, if not most, district court 
orders have no label or title besides “ORDER.”  Where that is 
the case, we will focus on the terms of the order.  In 
determining jurisdiction under § 16, however, we decline to 
conduct an extensive review of a district court’s 
accompanying memoranda.  See Conrad, 585 F.3d at 1384 
(rejecting an approach that “would require courts of appeals 
carefully to parse the district court motions and memoranda to 
determine, factually, whether the arguments pressed in the 
district court sufficiently raised the concerns of the FAA to 
deem the motion brought ‘under section 3’ or ‘under section 
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as well as the caption and relief requested in the underlying 
motion.  An explicit reference to the FAA, namely §§ 3, 4, or 
206, in the caption of a motion is not dispositive, although 
“those hoping to avail themselves of the immediate appeal 
provided for in the FAA would do well” to “caption the[ir] 
motion in the district court as one brought under [the] FAA.”  
Conrad, 585 F.3d at 1385.  We have exercised jurisdiction 
where motions are labeled simply—but clearly—“motions to 
compel arbitration,” so a party’s failure to cite the governing 
provision of the FAA does not necessarily preclude 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 770-71 & n.3.  
Nor does a district court’s subsequent mislabeling of a 
properly-captioned motion to compel arbitration as a motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment always place an order 
outside the scope of § 16.  Cf. Asbestospray, 182 F.3d at 207 
(attributing the district court’s use of the term “MODIFIED” 
in its order following a motion to clarify to a “mistake in 
draftsmanship”).  But if a motion does not at least request an 
order compelling arbitration or an order directing that 
arbitration proceed, then the denial of that motion is not 
appealable under § 16(a)(1)(B) or (C).  Mere “offhand 
references” to the FAA or to arbitration are not sufficient.  
See Conrad, 585 F.3d at 1386.   
 Importantly, we do not read § 16 as barring 
jurisdiction where both a motion to compel arbitration and a 
                                                                                                     
4’”); cf. Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 628-29 (expressing a 
preference for determining jurisdiction under § 16 by 
focusing on the “category of order appealed from” rather than 
engaging in a fact-intensive jurisdictional inquiry).     
   
 22 
 
motion to dismiss (or a motion for summary judgment) are 
made in the alternative.  While the FAA does not discuss a 
remedy of dismissal, it does not explicitly preclude requests 
for multiple forms of relief, and in Guidotti, we exercised 
jurisdiction under § 16 where the defendants filed motions to 
dismiss simultaneously with their motions to compel 
arbitration.  See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 767.  Other courts have 
also exercised jurisdiction over appeals where defendants 
filed motions to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to 
dismiss.  See, e.g., Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 
1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 2010); Suburban Leisure Ctr., Inc. v. 
AMF Bowling Prods., Inc., 468 F.3d 523, 524-25 (8th Cir. 
2006); see also Grosvenor, 733 F.3d at 1000 (“Had Qwest 
sought an order granting summary judgment on the issue of 
contract formation and an order compelling arbitration, there 
would be no question as to our jurisdiction.”).  However, we 
decline to treat a “request for an over-favorable remedy of 
dismissal,” Fit Tech, 374 F.3d at 6, as including a request for 
an order compelling arbitration.  Because the former would 
not invoke the statutory requirements of § 4 of the FAA, it 
cannot trigger the right to interlocutory appeal under § 16.  
Cf. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 270-71 (analyzing the incompatibility 
of the remedy of dismissal and the statutory scheme of the 
FAA). 
 C. Application to DeViedma’s Appeal        
 Given the analytical framework we adopt today, the 
order before us is clearly not appealable under § 16.  The 
Order provided: “Defendant Gaspar DeViedma’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 81, 82, and 84) is DENIED as 
to Count IV for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.  The Motion is 
otherwise GRANTED.”  (App. 3.)  It made no reference to a 
motion to compel or to the FAA.  As for DeViedma’s motion, 
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the motion was entitled, “Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Defendant Gaspar DeViedma,” and it began: “Pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, defendant Gaspar 
DeViedma moves for summary judgment on Counts IV and V 
of the First Amended Complaint.”  (DeViedma’s Mot. for 
Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 81.)  It went on to state: “Mr. 
DeViedma respectfully requests that this Court enter 
summary judgment in its favor and dismiss plaintiffs’ case 
with prejudice.”  (Id.)  In sum, DeViedma’s motion was not 
captioned as a motion to compel, did not reference § 4 or § 
206, and did not request an order compelling arbitration.  
Rather, it was captioned as a motion for summary judgment, 
referenced Rule 56, and requested only summary judgment 
and dismissal with prejudice.11  Further, there is no indication 
that the purported motion to compel complied with the 
procedural requirements of § 4.  Even if we presumed 
Devon’s “failure, neglect, or refusal . . . to arbitrate,” there is 
no indication that DeViedma gave Devon “[f]ive days’ notice 
in writing” of his impending motion to compel via “[s]ervice . 
. . in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”  9 U.S.C. § 4.  Therefore, the motion was clearly 
                                              
 11 Looking at DeViedma’s Memorandum of Law in 
support of the motion would not change our conclusion.  See 
App. 186 (“Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, defendant . . . 
moves for summary judgment in his favor . . . .”); App. 189 
(“DeViedma is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice of the 
claims against him . . . .”); App. 243 (stating in the conclusion 
that: “DeViedma is entitled to summary judgment in his favor 
on all claims against him . . . , and these claims should be 
dismissed with prejudice.”). 
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one for summary judgment, not to compel arbitration, and we 
lack jurisdiction over the order denying it. 
 We accept at face value that Devon was on notice 
about DeViedma’s preference for arbitration over litigation.  
Indeed, Devon acknowledged as much in its opposition to 
DeViedma’s summary judgment motion, and the District 
Court even remarked, in its Order: “We revisit whether 
Devon must be compelled to arbitrate its claims against 
DeViedma . . . .”  (App. 24.)  Thus, no one was “prejudicially 
misled” in this case by DeViedma’s styling of his motion as a 
motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to 
compel.  See Fit Tech, 374 F.3d at 6.  But our jurisdiction 
does not turn on whether the non-moving party was 
prejudiced or confused.  Rather, it turns on the category of the 
order from which an appeal is taken, and we identify that 
category by looking to the terms of the order, the caption of 
the underlying motion, and the relief requested within.  
Because DeViedma filed a motion for summary judgment and 
not a motion to compel arbitration, we lack jurisdiction under 
§ 16 of the FAA. 
III. Conclusion 
We conclude that the District Court’s denial of 
DeViedma’s Motion for Summary Judgment is not an 
appealable order under § 16(a)(1)(C) of the FAA.  
Accordingly, we will dismiss this interlocutory appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction.  
